IN 1980, I noted three characteristics of the U.S. union labor market: a tendency for union wage increases to outpace nonunion, an insensitivity of wage decisions to real demand conditions, and a gradual erosion of the membership base.1 In 1982, as dramatic developments in the determination of union wages began to unfold, I reported on a series of wage concessions that had been negotiated in industries as diverse as automobile manufacturing, intercity trucking, and meatpacking.2 Despite the widespread concessions, however, it was impossible at that time to detect any substantial change in the union labor market as described above.
Union Wage Concessions
The phenomenon of union wage concessions is not new. What is new in the 1980s is their volume. As table 1 fractions of workers under newly negotiated "major" private union contracts have had their first-year wages frozen or cut. Because some workers may have received more than one wage freeze or cut, it is not possible to estimate precisely the proportion of such workers experienc-ing at least one concession. However, the fraction can be estimated at between one-third and one-half under alternative assumptions.3 Could table 1 simply reflect the recent disinflation? Since price inflation variables inevitably show strong explanatory power in wage-change studies, perhaps real wage freezes and cuts are to be expected in periods of low inflation, as the mean of the wage-change distribution drifts downward. In fact, the available evidence does not bear out such an interpretation.
The year of lowest inflation in the early 1980s as measured by the CPI-W, the consumerprice index for urban wage earners and clerical workers, was 1983. A worker experiencing a wage freeze in that year would have suffered a real wage loss of 3.3 percent as measured by CPI-W. Column 4 of table 1 shows, for each year from 1959 to 1985, the proportion of workers with contracts providing first-year basic wage adjustments of 3.3 percentage points below CPI-W inflation.
In the early 1960s, when measured inflation was less than 2 percent, virtually no workers received wage settlements 3.3 percentage points below CPI-W. In two years, 1962 and 1963, significant proportions of workers under newly negotiated contracts received wage freezes, but the low inflation rate ensured that their real wage loss was well under 3.3 percent. Nor do productivity growth differences appear to be explanations for the differential wage performance in the two periods; the growth rate of nonfarm productivity in 1962-63 was about the same as in 1983-84.
The only periods before the 1980s in which substantial proportions of workers suffered such real wage losses were those of accelerating 3. An upper-limit estimate of the proportion of workers in the major union sector who experienced a wage freeze or cut since 1979 can be made by assuming (incorrectly), first, that no worker experienced more than one concession and, second, that the number of workers experiencing concessions in each year reflected the number of workers in that unit as of 1984 as reported in Current Wage Developments. The first assumption leads to an overstatement of the number of workers involved, because some workers did experience more than one concession. The second assumption tends to overstate the number of union workers experiencing concessions, since union membership generally fell in the private sector during the period of concession-making. (Note that the word "concession" is used interchangeably with "first-year wage freeze or cut" throughout this paper.) A lower-limit estimate can be made by taking only the two highest consecutive years of concessionmaking since 1979, since a worker was unlikely to be covered by two concessions in a twoyear period, and by using the larger 1983 base to compute the fraction. The upper-limit estimate using the methodology described above is 49 percent, and the lower limit is 33 percent.
inflation, such as 1973-74 and 1978-80. Thus, it appears that until the early 1980s, wage slippage could largely be attributed to unanticipated inflation and a lag in wage responsiveness to price developments. But after 1980 , that type of lag should have produced unanticipated real wage gains, not the erosion that actually occurred.
The early 1980s were characterized not only by disinflation but by high unemployment as well. Perhaps unemployment, a measure of labor demand conditions, accounts for the wage losses of the 1980s. But, again, the evidence does not suggest that the early 1980s was a period of "normal" wage determination. Table 2 shows the actual and predicted performance of six wage indexes (three union-oriented, two aggregate, one nonunion-oriented) during 1980-84, with predictions based on wage equations estimated over 1959-79. The equations contain a term for current unemployment and lagged price inflation; equations applying to the union sector use a union-oriented measure of unemployment rather than the official rate. Thus differences in economic conditions in union industries as compared with others are reflected in the union-oriented unemployment rate. Also, since the CPI suffered from a methodological problem involving mortgage interest rates (which boosted the index artificially in the late 1970s and early 1980s and tended to produce large residuals), an alternative price index has been used in the equations.4 4. The regressions run to obtain predicted data for table 2 were of the form of equation 1 in the text, where p is the annual percentage change in the deflator for personal consumption expenditures from the national income accounts lagged one year, and U-I is the current year inverse of an unemployment rate. For the union sector, a union-oriented unemployment rate was estimated by taking sectoral unemployment rates and weighting them by the proportion of union-represented workers in those sectors in 1984. Sectors used were agriculture, mining, durables, nondurables, transportation and public utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance and real estate, and services. (Since the data  in table 2 refer Sources: Current Wage Developments and author's regression as specified in equation 1. See footnote 4. a. Union wage indexes refer to major private settlements involving 1,000 or more workers. The hourly earnings index applies to production and nonsupervisory workers in the private, nonfarm sector and is adjusted to exclude the effects of overtime in manufacturing and interindustry employment shifts. Compensation per hour applies to all employees in the nonfarm, business sector and includes private and legally required fringe benefits. Selected nonunion earnings are the weighted average percentage changes in average hourly earnings for the following industries: SIC 533 (variety stores), SIC 56 (apparel stores), SIC 57 (furniture stores), and SIC 60 (banking). Weights used are the levels of production and nonsupervisory employment in 1979.
The three union and two aggregate wage index equations all produce overpredictions, particularly starting in 1982, suggesting that actual wage settlements and decisions have been lower than would have been expected, given economic conditions. This finding applies even when settlements involving wage freezes and cuts are removed from the index of first-year union wage agreements. That is, even those union settlements that did not involve wage freezes and cuts produced surprisingly low wage adjustments.
There is a difference, however, in the performance of the unionoriented indexes and the others with regard to the more recent residuals. The compensation-per-hour index, which includes many nonunion workers such as managers and supervisors, shows only a small residual by 1984. The hourly-earnings index, which exhibits a larger residual in that year, has a much larger union weight because it excludes supervisory personnel. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the 1984 residuals in the aggregate indexes heavily reflect union sector developments. Table 2 includes, as a test of this possibility, a nonunion hourlyearnings index for selected industries with low unionization. The low unionization rates ensure not only that there are few union workers covered by the index but also that spillover and "threat" effects from the union sector are minimal. In sharp contrast to the other indexes, this nonunion index is not overpredicted. The suggestion is that the recent slowing of wage growth has been concentrated in the union sector. As will be discussed below, there are good reasons to expect the norm shift phenomenon to be confined to the union sector.
There are also reasons to expect that the current lull in union wage setting will continue in the future. Table 3 shows the first-, second-, and third-year adjustments by year of negotiation as reported from a survey of union settlements by the private Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (BNA). Settlements involving fifty or more workers are summarized on a biweekly basis in the BNA Daily Labor Report. In the early 1980s, contracts tended to be "front loaded," that is, higher adjustments were scheduled in the earlier years of contracts, probably reflecting declining expectations of inflation and also an expectation of more escalator payments, or cost-of-living adjustments, in later years. (Escalator adjustments are excluded from the table.) During the most recent period shown, contract terms have flattened out to an even 4 percent per year. And, as will be demonstrated below, the flatness is unlikely to reflect expectations of large escalator increases later in the contract since escalator clauses have been limited in union concession agreements. Bargainers appear to expect a continuation of current moderate wage trends. A common interpretation of the concession movement is that it reflects deregulation in certain industries and increased foreign competition, associated with the appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s, in others. Some industries in table 4 easily fit those interpretations. The airline industry, for example, was clearly strongly affected by deregulation that permitted product market competition via price cutting and new entry. And metals, machinery, lumber, and the commercial side of aerospace all suffered from international competition. But not all industries neatly fit the mold.
Concession
weight to sectors with a propensity for short contracts. A sector with a higher proportion of concessions than of contracts is concession-prone. Some difficulties arise with this calculation method because the BNA uses more aggregate industry classifications than table 4 for certain sectors. Nevertheless, using approximations where necessary, all sectors listed in table 4 except lumber and paper and printing and publishing appear to be concession-prone. In particular, construction, which had 39 percent of the concessions reported on table 4 is estimated to account for only 18 percent of the contracts. Construction does have a propensity for short contracts so even the 18 percent figure is an overestimate. In the lumber and paper case, most of the major firms have reported concessions in some units, and it is likely that the sector would appear concession-prone if the calculation could be made based on the percentage of workers rather than contracts. Construction, the concession leader, was not subject to foreign competition. Nor, it turns out, was deregulation a decisive influence. Certain restrictions on nonunion bidding for federally financed construction projects were weakened through administrative changes in the Davis-Bacon Act in 1982, but because of delays due to litigation, the concession movement in construction was already well established before the most significant Davis-Bacon changes were implemented.6
The situation is the same in retail food stores and in printing and publishing. In neither is foreign competition or deregulation an issue. The only product market conditions that could have influenced wage settlements in construction, supermarkets, and printing are the general economic slump of the early 1980s and lower-wage, nonunion competition.
The shifting discretely between periods.7 For example, Perry argues that wage norms dropped in the early 1960s in response to low price inflation, an extended period of relatively high unemployment, and the federal wage-price guideposts program. They then shifted upward in the 1970s in response to the acceleration of inflation in the 1960s and the price shocks of the mid-1970s.
The importance of the norm shift concept is that it suggests a certain lethargy in the responsiveness of wage expectations and targets. Thus, the period of wage calm that developed in the early 1980s can be expected to herald a period of continued calm, even in the face of moderate real economic expansion. In turn, such a calm would, because of its antiinflationary effects, encourage the continuation of expansionary policies. Table 5 provides data suggestive of a broad downward shift in wage norms. The table shows that wage freezes and cuts began in a narrow range of industries in 1981 and have been spreading progressively ever since. As the number of industries affected grew, the conventional explanations-deregulation, foreign competition, general economic distress-became harder to credit, and the alternative hypothesis of a demonstration effect became more difficult to reject.
Explanations of the distress in the automobile industry in 1982, for example, do not carry over easily to concessions at Las Vegas hotels and at Disneyland in 1984. The fact is that management today, in virtually any type of industry, is much more likely to raise product market issues as part of its bargaining tactics than it would have in the 1970s. In a 1985 dispute involving an attempt by San Francisco gravediggers to recoup from a previous one-year wage freeze, management raised the specter of competitive inroads by nonunion cemeteries.8 When, as was the case in many of the initial concession settlements, imminent bankruptcy and mass layoffs were threatened, the resulting wage freezes and cuts were easy to rationalize. But the longevity of the concession movement and its spread to less-than-dire situations suggest that the initial concessions have encouraged other employers to try their luck in demanding similar settlements.
Additional evidence of a shift in the wage-setting climate is to be Unions simply lost more in the 1980s, in terms of both membership and wage settlements, than can be explained by economic circumstances and historical relationships. To the extent that unions lose membership only because of interindustry employment shifts, they need not lose bargaining power, though they might lose some political clout. But losses within industries do suggest weakened bargaining positions due to greater competition with nonunion firms in the product market.
DECREASED STRIKE ACTIVITY
Strike incidence has always posed an analytical puzzle to economists. In theory, strikes are random "mistakes" made by the parties about each other's true bargaining position. But in fact, strikes seem to reflect shifts in union militancy. Periods of upward adjustment in the wage norm, such as the late 1960s, have been accompanied by heavy strike activity. In contrast, in the early 1960s, when the wage norm was low, strike activity was quiescent. Table 6 suggests a resemblance between the early 1980s and the early 1960s in this regard. Whether measured by BLS indexes of reported strikes involving 1,000 or more workers or by Current Population Survey reports of individuals with ajob but absent from work because of a labor dispute, the level of strike activity accompanying the low wage settlements in the early 1980s fell sharply. Regression analysis also indicates an abnormally low incidence of strikes during the concession period. II There were some bitter disputes in the 1980s. However, in a number of prominent conflicts, such as Continental Airlines Corporation, Phelps Dodge Corporation, and Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, employers succeeded in operating with nonunion personnel, perhaps discouraging other workers from striking in an era of job insecurity. As long as this atmosphere of insecurity persists, as it is likely to do unless unemploy- ization developed in the management community.13 This change in management attitudes may well have been linked to the upward shift in wage-change norms, with its accompanying strikes, militancy, and rankand-file rejections of tentative settlements reached by union leaders. In any case, experimentation by employers revealed that the legal system could accommodate increased management resistance to new unionization without substantial penalties.
The 1984 presidential campaign was seen by organized labor as crucial to its future. While the AFL-CIO attempted to put a bright face on the Mondale electoral debacle by noting that a majority of their members supported the Democratic ticket, the large membership losses noted above raise important questions about the future political clout of unions. In the aftermath of Mondale's defeat, the AFL-CIO even began to reconsider whether collective bargaining should remain the centerpiece of its activities.14 There is no way of quantifying the impact of these developments on collective bargaining outcomes, but the overall effect will be to prolong the period of lowered wage expectations. The political and legal climate change has been reflected in a greater willingness by management to take actions in labor disputes that might not have been publicly or politically acceptable in the past. Operating with nonunion labor-or threatening to do so-seems more common than was once the case. Even firms with a long history of unionization are using nonunion labor. 16 During the early 1960s, there was discussion of a management "hardening" that coincided with a downward wage norm shift; the same symptoms are evident today.
THE UNION-NONUNION WAGE DIFFERENTIAL
The widening of the union-nonunion wage differential in the 1970s is by now a familiar story. Unfortunately, the BLS did not start explicitly measuring union and nonunion wage trends until the mid-1970s. Thus, estimates of the level of the differential, or the degree to which it widened, will vary depending on data sources. where U-1 is the inverse of the unemployment rate (or some other demand-sensitive variable), p is some measure of lagged price inflation, w is the annual rate of wage change, and a, b, and c are regression coefficients.17 The a coefficient can be viewed as a measure of wage pressure. Given a rate of price inflation and a real measure of labor demand, a large value of a would suggest higher wage increases; a lower value would suggest wage moderation. Similarly, the higher the value of b, the greater is wage sensitivity to real demand conditions; and the higher the value of c, the greater is wage sensitivity to price inflation. Concessions can be analyzed in terms of their effects on these three coefficients.
CHANGES IN WAGE PRESSURE
Perry's concept of changing wage "norms" can be discussed in terms of a shift in the a coefficient. In 1983, union wage concessions began to include two features that suggest a drop in wage pressure: first, the substitution of a fixed bonus for a guaranteed wage rate increase and second, pay cuts for entry-level employees. Both changes can be viewed as mechanisms by which a downward shift in wage norms can be accommodated.
Fixed The use of fixed bonus plans has an important wage-change effect, especially in multiyear contracts. A three-year contract containing a 3 percent wage increase each year produces an annual wage 9 percent above the initial base in the third year. In contrast, a bonus plan involving 3 percent lump sum distributions does not raise the basic wage at all and produces a compensation level only 3 percent above the initial base in the third year. Indeed, since such plans often do not pay the bonus to workers employed less than a full year before the payment date, the compensation increase averaged over the entire work force may well be less than 3 percent. 18 The second contractual feature that reduces labor cost increases is cuts in pay for entry-level employees. These arrangements, commonly called "two-tier wage plans" because of the dual pay or benefit structure created, are more likely than across-the-board pay cuts to win the approval of existing employees in union ratification votes. The plans are of two basic types. Permanent plans create an entirely separate pay structure for new hires, who never catch up with existing workers. Temporary plans provide for a catch-up period, though in some cases the catch-up period is so long-sometimes as much as ten years-that the plan is quasi-permanent. 19 18. The BLS currently is in a dispute with the aerospace industry over the treatment of bonuses in calculating average hourly earnings. The BLS wishes to exclude the bonuses, while the industry, which has sales contracts indexed to average hourly earnings in SIC 3721, wants to include them. As a result, earnings data for that industry are currently not being published.
For example, the Packard Electric Division of General Motors Corporation
Just under half of a sample of two-tier contracts collected by the BNA in mid-1984 were of the permanent variety.20 A survey of Los Angeles area firms that I conducted with Sanford M. Jacoby found that of those firms reporting two-tier plans, just over half had temporary plans only, almost 30 percent had permanent plans only, and the others had both types. 21 Although there have been some instances in which unions negotiated the abolition of a two-tier plan, adoption of the plans is still increasing. The BNA reported that 8 percent of all nonconstruction settlements had some type of two-tier system in 1984, up from 5 percent may be a way of restoring a wide wage spread. However, the implication of two-tier plans for future pay adjustments is simple arithmetic. As long as the proportion of employment in the lower tier is expanding, actual pay adjustments will be lower than those reported for the upper tier.
CHANGES IN RESPONSIVENESS TO DEMAND
While the concession settlements can be viewed as responsive to demand conditions, this does not imply that a greater responsiveness to demand-a larger b coefficient-can be expected in the future. Examining other characteristics of recent bargains sheds some light on this question. One explanation for past insensitivity of union wages to shortrun demand fluctuations has been the multiyear contract. Such contracts normally prevent wages from reacting to changes in demand after negotiations are concluded. They might also give rise to a multiyear wage-setting horizon that encourages bargainers to ignore economic conditions at the time of negotiations as "transitory."
In general, however, the concession contracts have maintained the multiyear framework, as can be seen in table 7. Contract durations for the concession agreements are slightly below the all-settlement average, but tend to be in the two-and-one-half-year range. Contracts with costof-living adjustment (COLA) clauses tend to be three-year agreements. Those with no COLA average a little over two years in length. Much of the shortening that has occurred is concentrated in construction, an industry that has shown a decided propensity to shift to one-year contracts during previous episodes of wage uncertainty.23
Profit sharing, which has been part of some concession agreements, adds an element of wage responsiveness to the business cycle, since profits are likely to reflect cyclical conditions. But profit sharing in the union sector does not appear to be spreading rapidly. In 1981, 10 percent of all concession contracts included profit-sharing plans. In 1984, only 3 percent did so; in the first six months of 1985, 4 percent. Measured by workers covered, rather than number of contracts, over 80 percent of the union workers covered by concession agreements with new profitsharing plans are at General Motors and Ford; the overall number of workers covered is probably in the 500,000 to 600,000 range. One reason that profit sharing is not more widespread is that concession bargainers often adopt employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) instead, primarily because ESOPs are the beneficiary of a variety of strong tax incentives. Thus, from 1983 to 1984, the number of workers, both union and nonunion, covered by ESOPs rose by 19 percent, and the number of ESOPs rose by over 6 percent.24 Except for the very rare case of 100 percent employee ownership, however, ESOPs do not affect labor costs; they simply spread the equity interest in the firm over a wider range of owners, some of whom happen to be employees. Major contract data suggest, however, that the "quality" of COLAs has deteriorated. During 1980-82, COLAs provided 60-70 percent protection against inflation; that is, a 1 percent increase in prices triggered a 0.6-0.7 percent wage increase. In 1983-84, the ratio was estimated at a little over 50 percent.26
The concession contract data support these findings. Table 8 COLAs can be limited in a number of ways: by diverting COLA money to fringe benefits; placing a cap on payouts regardless of the inflation rate; freezing operation of the COLA below a minimum rate of inflation; eliminating certain payments; reducing the frequency of payments, for example, from quarterly to annual; and delaying payments. With the exception of the last two devices, the COLA limitations will 25. Using the same data source on private sector workers under major contracts cited in footnote 10, I calculated the ratio of workers with COLAs to the total number of workers under major agreements in each industry as of November 1979. Actual and predicted numbers of workers with COLAs were then calculated for October 1984. The same tabulation was made for number of agreements.
26. These estimates were reported in Clurrent Wage Dei'elopments, various issues. Both the heavy use of COLA limitations in the concession agreements and the BLS data on the lessened degree of real wage protection provided by recent COLA clauses suggest a reduction in the c coefficient in the wage-change equation. As with the other concession features, there is no sure way of predicting the staying power of the innovations. However, the fact that the COLA principle was retained is significant. It is one thing to realign the real or relative wage level through COLA manipulations, another to pretend indefinitely that price inflation does not erode purchasing power. COLA clauses in themselves have typically provided less than 100 percent protection against inflation; yet contracts containing COLAs, including their guaranteed wage increases, have historically provided roughly full protection.28 Still, in the near term, COLA restrictions will mean that union wages will be less sensitive to price inflation than they were in the 1970s.
Implications for Aggregate Wage Change
Despite its notable shrinkage, the union sector still has a disproportionate weight in aggregate wage indexes, especially average hourly earnings. Union workers earn significant premiums compared with nonunion workers and also work longer hours per week. Thus, their weight in total payrolls exceeds their weight in total employment. Union wages have a weight of roughly one-third, for example, in the Employment Cost Index. Wayne Vroman estimates that union wages accounted for 48 percent of production worker pay as of 1980, thus giving them substantial weight in the average hourly earnings series. Their weight in average hourly earnings in manufacturing may be on the order of threefourths.29 As a result, union-sector wage developments remain important to aggregate wage changes. Nonunion wages do not mechanically follow union wages; if they did, the union-nonunion wage differential could not have widened as it did in the 1970s. The reversal of the widening trend after 1982 also suggests that the slowing of union wage growth is not being fully reflected in wages of nonunion employees. Of course, many nonunion employees do not work in close proximity to union workers and so might be relatively insulated from wage spillover effects. As a partial test of direct union-to-nonunion spillover in the early 1980s, I used BLS area wage surveys to select metropolitan areas where unionization of production workers was at least 70 percent in manufacturing, but where unionization of clerical workers in the same establishments was below 10 percent. Ten areas met these criteria. Table 9 compares the wage movements of heavily unionized production workers with those of the lightly unionized clerical workers. As can be seen, wages of clerical workers in the selected areas rose more slowly than those of blue-collar workers in the late 1970s, then more quickly from 1982 to 1984. Thus, the data for nonunion clerical workers in close proximity to unionized production workers exhibit the same tendencies found in general comparisons of nonunion and union wages. Nonunion workers were less affected by the downward norm shift of the 1980s than were union workers.
Of course, some spillovers to the nonunion sector did occur; it is easy to cite particular cases in which executive and nonunion white-collar pay was limited as a quid pro quo or as an inducement for union wage concessions.30 However, even if such union-to-nonunion spillovers are limited in importance, the union sector is still large enough for a downward shift in its wage norms to affect aggregate wage indexes. If the peak of concessionary settlements has now passed, there could be some "firming" of reported pay adjustments as the proportion of freezes and cuts diminishes. But even those settlements containing positive wage adjustments have been notably moderate in recent years. There is nothing in the labor market that would suggest a reversal of this moderation. overall rate by 1984.' I thus do not find it surprising that post-1983 union wage adjustments are lower than predicted on the basis of their past association with the union-oriented unemployment rate.
In addition to not fully capturing the significant differences in the labor demand conditions in more and less heavily unionized industries, the union wage growth predictions in table 2 ignore the fact that domestic nonunion competition, both realized and potential, has become a salient consideration for many unionized enterprises. Mitchell is obviously cognizant of the importance of nonunion competition. Later in the paper, he presents evidence both that the union-nonunion wage differential grew substantially during the 1970s and that union representation declined more between 1979 and 1984 than could be accounted for by shifts in industry composition. A plausible interpretation of this pattern of facts is that the growth in the potential cost advantage of operating without a union during the 1970s and the apparent persistence of that advantage encouraged the development of viable nonunion enterprises, which now pose a serious threat to the union sector. Insofar as nonunion substitutes for union goods and services have become more readily available, this growth in nonunion competition seems likely to have increased the elasticity of demand for union labor, a change, standard models suggest, that should lead a union that values both wages and employment to reduce its wage demands. Richard Freeman and James Medoff have provided some cross-sectional evidence that union wage premiums are larger in heavily organized industries.2 While it goes beyond their findings to say that an increase in nonunion competition should lead to a relative slowing in the rate of growth in union wages, that proposition is consistent with their results. Moreover, insofar as unions now face greater obstacles to organizing new units than they did in the past, one would expect the threat of nonunion competition to have increased even in cases where the nonunion share of employment has not risen much, particularly in industries with low barriers to entry. Had the intensity of nonunion competition been taken into account in the wage growth equations that underlie table 2, something that it would admittedly not have been trivial to do, predicted union wage growth would surely have been closer to actual union wage growth.
Mitchell also regards the spread of wage concessions to an increasing number of industries as evidence of a shift in union wage-setting behavior. This spread, however, is less dramatic than table 5 might suggest; fewer than 5 percent of all concession settlements made during 1983, and a similar percentage of all concession settlements made during 1984 or the first half of 1985, actually represented a "spread." The rest occurred in industries that had already experienced some concession activity during 1981 or 1982.3 The factors that explain early concession activity would appear to explain most subsequent concession activity as well.
Whether present union wage moderation is attributable to a shift in the union wage determination process or to economic developments, union wage increases have indeed been quite moderate over the past few years; what can we expect over the next few years? The answer to this question will depend both on the features of existing multiyear contracts and on the pattern of new settlements. As an aside, I was rather surprised by Mitchell's evidence that concession agreements had not abandoned the multiyear framework and in fact were almost as long on average as nonconcession agreements. This suggests that the unions signing these agreements generally saw themselves to be accommodating lasting shifts in the economic environment, rather than purely shortterm difficulties. Mitchell's examination of the features of recently negotiated collective bargaining agreements focuses on the emergence of fixed bonus plans and two-tier wage structures. It should perhaps be emphasized that fewer than 15 percent of collective bargaining agreements currently contain either a fixed bonus plan or a two-tier wage scheme. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether these features are retained in subsequent bargaining rounds. Given the internal political problems that a two-tier wage system seems sure to cause for any union, I would expect these schemes to be short-lived.
Certain features built into current contracts will work to raise future wage increases relative to current wage increases. As Mitchell notes, the ratio of average annual life-of-contract wage increases to first-year increases in major collective bargaining agreements has risen markedly in the past few years. Contracts used to be decidedly front-loaded; BLS My agreement with Mitchell's conclusion that we can expect moderate union wage increases over the next few years rests more on an assessment of the underlying economic factors than on an analysis of specific contract provisions. The heavily unionized industries appear to be plagued by a variety of problems, and unionized enterprises generally are increasingly threatened by nonunion competition. All this suggests that union wage settlements will remain moderate for the foreseeable future. Much of the discussion focused on the relationship between industry conditions and industry wages. Baily noted that the observed constancy of wage differentials might be the result of institutional rigidities that prevent wages from adjusting, but alternatively might indicate a labor market where mobility costs were low, so that changes in industry conditions would produce movements of workers rather than adjustments in wages. Robert Hall stated his view that collective bargaining agreements contain many provisions designed to accommodate shifts in labor demand, so that only shifts in labor supply require contract renegotiation. The fact that concessions have not been limited to industries affected by deregulation or foreign competition provides evidence that shifts in labor supply conditions rather than shifts in product market conditions motivated the wage freezes and cuts.
General
William Nordhaus was struck by the fact that the union-nonunion wage differential had declined only about 3 percentage points between 1982 and 1985, in spite of the highly adverse conditions faced by the heavily unionized industries. He reported that his own work on industry wage growth suggested that industries subject to deregulation or foreign competition had not experienced slower wage growth than industries sheltered from those pressures, at least through 1984. In Nordhaus's view, these results provide evidence of the surprising stubbornness of wage differentials. Baily noted that determining whether or not a particular industry had been affected by foreign competition could be quite a subtle matter. As an example, he mentioned the chemical industry, which has been significantly affected by foreign competition even though import penetration in the industry itself is low. What has happened is that foreign competition in apparel manufacturing has reduced the domestic demand for synthetic fibers produced by the chemical industry. Lawrence Summers echoed Nordhaus's view that wage structures are surprisingly stubborn; in his own work on nonunion wage differentials, he has found that the cross-industry relative wage structure displays remarkable stability over five-to ten-year periods, even in the face of quite different growth rates across industries.
Mitchell noted that the employment figures cited by Katharine Abraham in her formal comments, showing that employment in unionized industries was lower in both 1983 and 1984 than it had been in 1979, obscured the fact that most of the employment declines in the unionized industries had already occurred by the fourth quarter of 1982, the trough of the recession; after 1982, things generally began to improve. He questioned whether union workers who had lost theirjobs in 1982 would exert much influence on union wage settlements reached a year or two years later. Mitchell also pointed to table 9 of the paper, which reports estimated wage growth rates for largely unionized production workers and largely nonunionized clerical workers working for manufacturing employers in ten metropolitan areas. Between 1975 and 1979, the growth rate of the unionized production workers' wages exceeded that of the nonunionized clerical workers' wages; between 1982 and 1984, the pattern was reversed. Mitchell noted that product market conditions cannot explain this relative slowing in the rate of union wage growth, since the two groups whose wages enter this comparison work in the same establishments, and he argued that this was additional evidence for his view that something beyond industry conditions had affected recent union wage settlements.
Several participants commented on the growth of the union-nonunion wage differential during the 1970s. Gordon noted that the growth in wages in the heavily unionized U.S. manufacturing sector exceeded the trend rate of growth in productivity from the 1960s onward; indeed, the excess of wage growth over productivity growth was larger in U.S. manufacturing than in that of any of the European countries. Michael Wachter reported that work he has done with Peter Linneman based on Current Population Survey data from 1973 through 1984 shows a systematic negative relationship between the union wage premium within an industry and employment growth in the same industry. Thus Wachter finds it puzzling that union wage premiums have not shrunk more than they have; even many of the recent concession settlements, he observed, have involved temporary wage postponements rather than permanent wage reductions. Stanley Fischer urged that the recent slowing in the rate of union wage growth not be viewed as a lowering of "wage norms," thought of in terms of rates of increase; a more economic approach would be to model recent developments as an overshooting of union wage levels in the 1970s that has to be worked off now. James Duesenberry took the position that factors such as deregulation, foreign competition, and nonunion competition are likely to have an important effect on union wage growth, but he went on to note the existence of case-by-case evidence of a major shift in the political environment of the collective bargaining process. Employers now demand and receive wage concessions they would never have expected ten years earlier. For example, employers today are quite likely to receive public support for replacing strikers with other workers; ten years ago, strikebreakers would have been termed scabs and their use widely disapproved. However, rather than characterizing the effect of these exogenous shifts in the collective bargaining environment as a shift in the wage norm, Duesenberry argued for the incorporation of political factors in economic models of wage-setting behavior.
Baily took the fact that wage concessions were occurring in conjunc-tion with a reduced level of strike activity as evidence that there has been a retreat on the workers' side of the collective bargaining table. He argued that if the recent wage concessions were attributable to a management hardening, as some popular discussion has suggested, one would have expected concessions to be won only with an increase in the number of strikes. Shoven noted that two-tier wage schemes offer only a temporary slowing in the rate of wage growth. Under a temporary two-tier scheme, an initial slowing in the rate of wage growth will be followed by more rapid wage growth as workers on the bottom tier catch up with those on the top tier; even under a permanent two-tier system, wage growth will be slowed only during the period when new workers are entering the second tier, though that period might last for some time.
